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BOOK REVIEW:
AGAINST BIOETHICS
Authored by: JonathanBaron*
In Against Bioethics, Professor Baron argues that applied bioethics
often causes harm that could be avoided through the application of a
kind of decision analysis based on utilitarianism. Such analysis in
terms of expected consequences is designed to yield the best outcomes.
When some other method of decision making is used, such as one
based on application of intuitive or deontological principles, we should
not be surprised if the consequences are worse than could be achieved
if we focused on consequences. Of course, it could turn out that we
achieve the best outcomes by trying to do something else, but I argue
that we have little reason to think so, if our consequentialist analysis is
sufficiently careful.
Reviewed by: Dr. MargaretByrne**
Against Bioethics is an exposition of how the field of bioethics could
and should improve its methodology and approach in analysis of
difficult ethical questions. The title does not reflect the actual goals of
the book, as Dr. Baron is not against bioethics, but rather against
bioethical analysis and debate as it is generally conducted. Bioethics, as
is pointed out in this book, lacks a theoretical foundation that comes
from a single coherent guiding principle;1 bioethics uses tradition and
intuitive judgments as the basis of much "ethical analysis."
Unfortunately, these judgments do not always lead to the best
outcomes. Dr. Baron proposes and describes how bioethics could use

* Jonathan Baron is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.
** Dr. Byrne is a health economist and Research Associate Professor in the
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health at the University of Miami Miller
School of Medicine. She is faculty in the University of Miami Bioethics Program and
Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center. She received formal bioethics training
through a National Science Foundation fellowship. Her subsequent co-authored work
analyzing health care behavior in theoretical economic models has allowed for
formalization and investigation of various ethically problematic issues such as
compensation for refusing treatment at the end of life, the therapeutic misconception,
advanced directives, and payments to research subjects and organ donors.
1JONATHAN BARON, AGArNST BIOETHICs 4 (The MIT Press, ed. 2006) (Feb. 2006).
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utilitarian decision analysis as the basis for analyses in this wellwritten, engaging, and important book.
The premise of this book is that applied bioethics includes a
multitude of often conflicting basic principles and leads to conclusions
that do not maximize social or even individual welfare because the
bioethics discipline developed piecemeal as a reaction to "catastrophes"
and suffers from a lack of coherent theory. The basic bioethical
principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice are shown to
conflict not only with each other in many situations, but also with
themselves. 2 Reconciliation among these principles in practice is
difficult, and individuals will differ in which one they believe should
dominate. 3 Thus, different individuals will reach different conclusions
as to the "right" thing to do, and situations will arise where adherence
to traditional bioethical principles results in unfortunate situations.
Dr. Baron uses the case of Jesse Gelsinger to exemplify how
conflicting principles and piecemeal development of bioethics codes
have lead to situations with bad "rules" and bad outcomes. Gelsinger
died at age eighteen following participation in a gene replacement
study at the University of Pennsylvania. He had a mild metabolic
disease, which in a severe form is quickly fatal for infants. The
experimental gene therapy was hoped to be eventually used to treat
these infants that would otherwise die within a few weeks of birth.
Because of requirements for informed consent, the experimental
therapy could not be tested in infants; thus, adult volunteers were used.
Dr. Baron argues cogently that the restriction on using infants in a
study of this type is nonsensical: the infants will die anyway in the
absence of a successful treatment, and the research risks are transferred
to adult individuals who would not benefit (much) from development
of a successful treatment. Dr. Baron uses this case to illustrate how
applied bioethics currently leads to situations that do not result in the
best possible outcomes.
As a solution to the current state of affairs in bioethics, Dr.
Baron proposes the use of utilitarianism and decision analysis as the
theoretical foundation of bioethical analysis. Chapters Two lays out a
comparison of "traditional" bioethics and utilitarianism, and Chapter
Three describes utilitarianism and the decision analytic approach that is
being advocated in the book. In utilitarianism, the goal is to maximize
expected utility, and, thus, decisions based on utilitarianism in theory
always lead to the best possible outcome. In fact, he takes the view that
2 Id. at

10.

3 Id. at 15
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"all of the basic principles used in applied bioethics can be understood
as having utilitarian roots,"4but it is when the utilitarian justification of
these principles is forgotten that they "take on a life of their own, so5
that they are applied even in cases when they fail to maximize utility."
Thus, bioethics should go back to the fundamentals of utilitarianism. Of
course, following a guiding theory of utilitarianism and decision
analysis may lead to different outcomes from traditional bioethical
principles, but the outcomes will be the best possible outcomes in terms
of utility maximization.
Dr. Baron describes utilitarianism, expected utility theory and
decision analysis theory in a straightforward, easy to understand
manner. Conflicts and controversies surrounding these theories are
discussed. For example, an important question for maximizing utility is
whose utility should be maximized? Should we conduct analyses based
on either an individual or a societal utility level? As there are many
types of utilitarian models with specific forms, which one should we
use? 6 Some utilitarian formulations include utility for values that mirror
deontological values, whereas others do not. Although decisions as to
specific forms will have to be made, one of the touted strengths of the
utilitarian/decision analysis approach is that the tradeoffs and
judgments necessary to reach a decision are explicit. Through making
these explicit, Dr. Baron argues that better decisions will be made.
It is only at this point in the book where I have a few technical,
economic based issues with the discussion. Although it is
acknowledged that various forms of utilitarianism exist, the actual
extent of the problem of specifying a functional form for the utility
equation that will underlie utility maximization is swept under the
carpet a bit. Economists, of which I am one, can spend months trying to
develop a utility function that should be used in a particular modeling
situation. Not only is there a question of what to include in such a
function or how to weight each component (which is discussed), but
another large question is also how the components relate to each other.
Expected utility theory often uses a linear additive functional form;
however, there are many other possibilities. Although the decision
analyses that are based on expected utility theory are normative and not
descriptive (as many economic models are), it is not obvious what form
our utility functions should take, and the appropriate form may vary
with different situations. Although I unreservedly agree that basing
4 Id. at

18.

at 20.
IId.

6 BARON,

supra note 1, at 27 n. 1.
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bioethics analysis on utilitarianism and decision analysis is more
transparent because it makes processes explicit and will lead to better
outcomes, more work is needed to develop more specifics as to how
exactly the theory will be used in practice. However, as this is the first
book proposing such an approach in bioethics, it is hard to fault the
current work; rather, I would just emphasis the need for future work in
this area.
Nevertheless, it is clear that decision analytic approaches can
help us understand at a more fundamental level what the true
conflicting issues are in any given situation. In several places, Dr.
Baron acknowledges that decision analysis quantification will be
difficult, and thus we might get the wrong numbers. However, in most
cases, this will not matter: either the preferred outcome will be clear, or
if it is very close, then the decision really could go either way anyway.
The remainder of the book touches on a number of important
topics in bioethics, describes how these topics are often debated and
how decision analysis theory would lead to different, and better
conclusions by providing a cohesive guiding theory for analysis of
these issues.
Examples of bioethics cases where people are accused of
"trying to play God" are discussed in Chapter Four. This includes
controversies over designer babies, embryonic stem cell research, and
drugs designed to improve human performance as opposed to curing
disease. A great number of the ethical arguments against these things
are based on the naturalistic fallacy. 7 The naturalistic fallacy is an

intuitive heuristic of judging what is good by what is natural, i.e., what
"is" is seen as indicative of what "should be." However useful this may
be at times, Baron argues that it has been overextended and thus may
be harmful in a number of areas. Use of a utility maximizing principle
for bioethical analysis would possibly avoid these harms in several
domains; for example, in the development of new drugs, limits on
reproduction, and possibly insufficient research on life extension. Dr.
Baron stresses strongly here, and in other places, that many of the
questions that are being debated, for example whether we should try to
prolong life, are empirical questions that we just do not have enough
data yet to decide. Thus, the debates should be tabled until we have the
facts necessary for a meaningful discussion.
Death and the value of life is the subject of Chapter Five,
focusing on the question of how to measure the value of life. Quality
7Id. at

77.
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adjusted life years (QALYs) are often used in health economics and8
alive.
medical decision making research to measure the utility of being
A careful description of QALYs is provided, including the advantages
of this approach and the question of whose values to use. This chapter
also brings to the forefront how a utility based approach may conflict
with more traditional ethics approaches. An example of this conflict is
the value of life of a blind person versus a sighted person. Research and
our basic intuitions say that the quality of life for a blind person will be
lower than for that of a sighted person. Thus, as the utility of the blind
is less than the sighted, saving the life of a blind person must be worth
less than saving that of a sighted person. 9 Clearly, many people will
protest this assertion, but it does illustrate the potential conflict between
basing bioethical decisions on utilitarian principles versus traditional
intuitive judgments.
A sketch of a decision analysis of assisted suicide is also
presented in this chapter,' 0 and it clearly illustrates the steps by which
decision analysis theory can be applied to difficult cases. Of course,
because this approach has not been used in practice, the analysis is
caught at the stage of having too little empirical information for the
utility maximization process to reach a final conclusion. Even if more
empirical evidence on relevant values were available, Dr. Baron
acknowledges that there will still be errors and some uncertainties.
Nevertheless, a formal analysis of the decision theory type allows one
to explicitly state each of the underlying assumptions and values that
are feeding into a recommendation. The recommendation may be
accepted or not, but at least the basis of the recommendation will be
known.
Chapter Six discusses broadly the issue of informed consent,
which generally grows out of the principle of autonomy and respect for
persons. However, holding that informed consent is an absolute value
can have many damaging consequences and, in this chapter, Dr. Baron
shows that utilitarian decision analysis can help make tradeoffs
between the value of informed consent and other principles to achieve
better outcomes. He notes that there are a number of utilitarian
advantages to autonomy: people know their own values better than
anyone, the quality of decisions improve as more are undertaken, and
people may value autonomy for itself. However, for a specific situation,
it will not always be the case that "respecting autonomy" by requiring
' Id. at 84
'Id. at 88.
" Id. at 92.
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informed consent would take precedent, as is shown in a simple
decision analysis of whether informed consent should be required in the
case of emergency surgery. The overarching thrust of this chapter is to
argue that consent procedures should be analyzed in terms of their costs
and benefits, in utility terms, not as a rigid requirement for autonomy
and competence.
Although the broad topic of Chapter Seven is conflict of
interest, much of the chapter focuses on using decision analysis to
tackle the issues of Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight. I
would doubt there is a medical researcher in the country that has not
had delays, frustrations, arguments, controversies, and even abandoned
projects due to oversight from an IRB. Dr. Baron is no exception and
provides examples of IRB interference that would be amusing if they
were not true.1 If a decision analysis weighed the benefits and costs of
the current practice of IRB, it seems fairly clear that the costs would far
outweigh the benefits. An alternative system is proposed in which the
IRB does not require prior approval for research, but would increase its
disciplinary power. Thus, the IRB would intervene at the point where
risky behavior is committed, not before. It would have been instructive
and illustrative for this chapter to include a more detailed sketch of
what a decision analytic approach to evaluating these two options
would include. Although data might not be available for measurement,
a more complete description of components would be instructive.
Various aspects of research conduct are analyzed and discussed
in Chapter Nine, which is entitled "Drug research," although the
discussion applies much more broadly. The premise of this chapter is
that the development of new drugs is one of the most efficient ways to
improve health and prolong life, yet drug approval is slow and these
delays cause harm. Thus, two options for increasing the speed at which
trials can be done are discussed: payments to subjects and using
subjects in poor countries. For each of these, the usual "ethical"
arguments against them are described and effectively refuted by Dr.
Baron. Payments to subjects are most likely to benefit everyone, and it
is illogical to say that payments take away individuals' choices, as the
whole point of autonomy is to allow people to choose. As individuals
can always choose not to participate in research, the provision of
payments can not be coercive. However, others have argued that large
payments will impel individuals to join trials that are risky, and thus we
should not provide payments. Dr. Baron argues that the question of
11BARON, supra note 1, at 140.
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whether money blinds people to risk is an empirical question, although
I have to chime in that I think this whole argument is a non-starter. If
we think that providing money will drive people to join a study that we
are worried is too risky, then we probably should not be doing that
study! Providing a financial incentive or not does not change the risk
inherent in the trial. If it is too risky with a payment, it is also too risky
without one.
A decision theoretic perspective is also taken to examine the
question of research that uses subjects in poor countries. From that
perspective, arguments against such research do not make sense. The
example of a placebo controlled trial of AZT in Africa in 1997 is
discussed.' 2 In Africa, the "best available alternative treatment" for
HIV transmission was nothing; yet, there was great controversy over
conducting the placebo controlled trial. However, from a decision
theoretic/utility maximizing point of view, individuals were better off
from having the trial conducted, and, thus, "this [was] a clear case ' of
a
3
moral intuition about fairness getting in the way of people's good.'
The very important issue of allocation of resources is discussed
in Chapter Nine. From a utilitarian approach of course, allocation holds
that resources should be allocated to do the most good. Unlike
traditional ethical approaches that often seem to compare options to
some ideal and when the options are found deficient, rejected, decision
analysis can be used to evaluate realistic options concerning
allocations. That is, realistic options that policy makers face now can be
compared to determine which is the better option. Unfortunately,
allocations are more often based on intuition or heuristics that suffer
from a long list of biases, including: omission bias, protected values, ex
ante bias, proportionality and zero risk, confusions of marginal and
average, and matching versus maximizing. These biases have led to
inconsistencies and less than optimal outcomes in many allocation
areas, including organ distribution, insurance, and Oregon's experiment
with rationing health care, which are described here. Education,
particularly teaching people about decision theory, is touted as a means
of reducing these biases to improve outcomes.
Finally, the concluding chapter looks at the "Bigger Picture"
and the problems of allocation at a universal level. A summary of what
utilitarian decision analysis teaches us to do includes: thinking

12

Id. at 164.

"3

Id. at 165.
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quantitatively, comparing options, considering the future and
psychological effects, and combining utilities.
Dr. Baron's book is an example of a provocative and necessary
critique of the traditional foundations of bioethics, but, most
importantly, provides a clear and convincing picture of an alternative
approach. Utility maximization and decision analysis theory can
fruitfully be used to analyze many difficult situations and ethical
dilemmas. They are based on a sound conceptual basis that has strength
in explicitly laying out of all of the underlying assumptions to an
analysis. This is a tremendous improvement over much of the
traditional ethical debate where, because it is not formalized,
underlying assumptions are often not made clear, which leaves any
conclusions on shaky ground. This book should be widely read by all
those who advise on or practice bioethics or bioethical-related issues.

